



THE IMPACT OF INTERNAL AND INTERNATIONAL LABOUR MIGRATION:  
**COUNTRY STUDY SOUTH AFRICA**

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## LIST OF ACRONYMS

ACMS	African Centre for Migration and Society
DHA	Department of Home Affairs
HSRC	Human Sciences Research Council
IOM	International Organization for Migration
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SAMP	Southern African Migration Project
STATS SA	Statistics South Africa
TEBA	The Employment Bureau of Africa
ACMS	African Centre for Migration and Society
DHA	Department of Home Affairs

## INTRODUCTION: MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA

With a focus on the link between migration and development, this report reviews key findings of existing quantitative and qualitative studies related to the impact of internal and international migration in South Africa along with respective migrant-sending areas. This report's aim is twofold. Firstly, it provides an account of what we do and do not know about the economic, health and social effects of migration on those who move and the places, households and populations they move between and amongst. Secondly, it builds on de Haas's suggestion to approach the link between mobility and development in a more nuanced and less deterministic fashion that acknowledges the heterogeneity, conditionality, inter-temporality, locally specific nature as well as structural and individual determinants of the impacts of migration (de Haas 2010: 238,241, see also Crush and Frayne 2007:7-8). Thus, this report also provides suggestions for a number of broader conceptual and paradigmatic shifts in the way we think about migration and development in South Africa.

To achieve a more holistic and better-informed approach to the acutely important developmental and population dynamics within and towards the country, this report makes a number of particular arguments:

- To accommodate the particular spatial dynamics of mobility in South Africa;
- To consider the profoundly translocal/transnational nature of frequently circular and temporary migrant trajectories within the region;
- To examine the complex, politically highly charged nature of the socio-institutional environment in South Africa and its relations to its neighbouring countries (see, for example, Landau and Wa Kabwe Segatti 2009).

While such a suggestion strays beyond this report's initial mandate, it is also crucial to explore and challenge the discourses and motivations underlying the way the migration-development link is conceptualised and what areas are focused upon as part of this more holistic approach (see Landau and Vigneswaran 2007). Furthermore, as will be discussed in more detail in the policy theme paper for South Africa, it is vital that we broaden the study of migration beyond migrants and policies explicitly relating to them, and look at government policy and practice in more general terms. There is a vital need to explore in more detail the ways that current policies impact on the poor, including poor migrants, and their ability to earn a livelihood in South Africa and the region - with the overall aim of rendering policies within *all* economic and social spheres more 'pro poor' and to maximise the developmental benefits of migration.

Thinking about migration and development in South Africa in broader conceptual terms also includes thinking beyond a predominantly micro-economic perspective and the bias of what has been termed the 'euphoria' about remittances. Contemporary Southern African countries provide rather few of the 'favourable economic and political conditions', which, as de Haas (2010) argues, allows migration to play 'a positive role in the development of regions and countries of origin.' Most of the evidence presented here points towards the crucial role of remittances in household consumption, rather than in productive investment fostering development in the conventional sense. The existing evidence from Southern Africa supports the suggestion of Kapur (2003:28-29) and others that remittances play an important role in addressing 'transient poverty' at household levels but are rather ill-suited to alleviate broader 'structural poverty'(see also de Haas 2010:255).

However, despite these qualifications, the report argues that there are important aspects of remittances which are currently neglected that warrant further research in order to move towards a more holistic understanding of their impacts and uses.

While the studies reviewed here look at areas as diverse as health, processes of brain drain/gain or household wellbeing, most concur that there is an urgent need to make population mobility a much more prominent feature within broader poverty reduction and developmental policies in South Africa and the region. As of now, migration and development are still seen as predominantly separate spheres of policy (Crush and Frayne 2007:2). Central to any type of planning for South Africa's diverse populations (and, as many studies reviewed here argue, key to fully capitalising on the benefits migration can bring about as well as mitigating its negative impacts) is the collection of reliable data on all types, patterns and impacts of mobility. Currently, the lack of data is probably the most commonly referred to research gap identified in the studies reviewed throughout this report. In relation to internal migration, most of the data from censuses and household surveys are extremely limited when it comes to analysing mobility, mobility patterns and related impacts. With regard to international migration, As Cross et al (2009: 19) point out,

there are no justifiable estimates of the size of the foreign-born African population inside South Africa at present (...) although the national Census attempts to count cross-border migrants living in South Africa, difficulties in accurately identifying migrants who prefer to remain invisible inevitably undermine this enumeration exercise.

Another important insight with important implications for all sections addressed in this report is the need to question the various categories and distinctions between different types of migrants – for example 'forced' and 'economic' or 'international' and 'internal' - when we think about development. As an example of this, the studies reviewed here that relate to the link between migration, health and access to healthcare or those ones on the use of remittances show that there are enough similarities between internal and international migrants to warrant a more generalised approach (see also Crush and Frayne 2007:8-9). As Landau and Wa Kabwe Segatti (2009:3) argue, given the diversity of mobility that we see in and around South Africa, there is an urgent need for mainstreaming migration within broader developmental and social policies and 'to develop bureaucratic and planning mechanisms to address human mobility more broadly (see also Crush and Frayne 2007:9). Furthermore, we can gather from a number of studies that the impacts of migration on local economies and communities can only be appropriately assessed once the frequently transient, temporary or circular nature of migration trajectories within the Southern African region is taken into account – and the related insight that migration impacts vary according to point in time and between different areas within South Africa. The findings of many empirical studies reviewed here – such as Lurie's work on migration and HIV (12 and 14); Vearey and others' work on migration, health and access to health care (see page 14 and 15) or Lubkemann's work on transnational households (page 16) - stress that migrant lives take place in multiple locations and that any development policy that wants to succeed needs to accommodate the nature of these trajectories that span the entire region. Paradigmatically, this will require a significant shift which should be able to draw on the by now significant and well-developed literatures on migration, transnationalism and translocalism.

Finally, looking at broader social and institutional contexts in which migration and developmental dynamics are embedded into, the highly prevalent xenophobia in South Africa needs to be acknowledged, explored and addressed as a major obstacle to human, social and economic development. While still rarely conceived as an developmental issue, xenophobia needs to be seen as profound hindrance to development: it heightens the vulnerability and discrimination of

all those considered 'different' or 'Other', creates profound inequalities within a society, fosters distrust of diversity and tolerance in general, undermines the rule of law and poses a major obstacle to social cohesion and social justice (Crush and Ramachandran 2009:3, 60).

### Methods and Structure

This review draws information from papers that relate to the impacts of both internal as well as international mobility on development in South Africa as well as the places that migrants come from. It includes peer reviewed academic papers as well as grey literature including unpublished Masters and Doctoral theses as well as reports and studies by major organisations working with migrants and refugees in the Southern African region. All papers and articles used were written in English. Articles were found through a combination of database (EBSCO Host, ISIWeb of Science, Ingenta Connect, JSTOR, SAGE Journals Online, ProQuest) and Google searches (including Google scholar searches). The search terms used can be found in Appendix 2.

Generally speaking, we do not know much about the impacts of all types of migration in South Africa. While this report presents anecdotal evidence, it needs to be noted that this will only be able to provide a few glimpses into an as of yet largely under-researched field. The lack of data and research is also the reason why some sections in this report remain blank or only present little information.<sup>1</sup> The sections on the research gaps that need to be addressed are much more detailed than those on the few 'lessons learnt.'

While generally following the structure given for this report, the author replaced 'contribution to local economy' with the more neutral 'Impacts on local economy' to provide a balanced view as the literature records both positive as well as negative impacts on local economies (although it is possible to make a negative contribution, such language is unnecessarily misleading). Furthermore, in section 1, 2 and 3, 'impacts on immediate family' and 'impacts on extended family' were combined to the all-encompassing 'impacts on family' due to the fact that there were no studies specifically distinguishing between the two. While most studies seem to focus on immediate family members such as spouses and children, the term 'household'(and whom it includes) is often ill defined and used indiscriminately – an important methodological shortcoming identified in the existing literature that will need to be addressed.

## SECTION 1: INTERNAL MIGRATION

### 1.1: OVERVIEW ON RECENT INTERNAL MIGRATION TRENDS OF THE COUNTRY

#### Numbers

Although there has been a strong public and political focus on international migration, population mobility within the country by far exceeds the former in terms of overall volumes (Polzer 2010:2-3). However, we do not know exactly how many internal migrants there are, where, how and why they move. While the South African migrant labour system has been well researched in the 1970s and 1980s, few nationally representative data and studies on recent internal mobility in South Africa exist (Posel 2003:1, Kok et al 2003). A major reason for the lack of nationally representative data on domestic mobility is the fact that since 2000, apart from very basic questions, more detailed data on migration patterns, histories and remittance flows is no longer collected in national survey instruments (Posel 2003:7, Oosthuizen and Naidoo 2004: 42).<sup>2</sup> The only numbers based on national data comes from Posel and Casale (2003:4), drawing on the 1993 Project for Statistics on Living Standards and Development and the 1995, 1997 and 1999 October Household Surveys. They report that the percentage of African rural households with at least one migrant worker has increased from 32.6% in 1993 to 35.8% in 1999 – increasing the numbers from 1,313,300 to 1,722,400 –over 400,000 households more within 6 years. Using 1996 census data, Kok et al (2003:53) found that a quarter of the South African population had migrated across district boundaries. Drawing on data from the 2003 Agincourt survey of 26 villages with a population of approximately 82, 000, Khan et al (2003:9) report that labour migration remained high at around 60% for older adult males during the 1990s, and that ‘younger adult males, aged 15-34 years, show a trend of an annual increase since 1997.’

#### Gender

Several studies report a recent increase in female labour migration within South Africa (Khan et al 2003:9,11; Posel 2003:8). Posel and Casale (2006:5) found that the percentage of women amongst South African internal migrants rose from 30 % in 1993 to approximately 34 % in 1999. As the proportion of male migrants changed little during this period, the increase in female migration a particularly significant contribution to the frequently reported overall increase in internal migration (Posel (2003:1,8). Wentzel et al (2006:185) using the 2001–02 Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) Migration Survey covering a national sample of 3618 households’ found that the shares of female and male migrants was almost even: 51 % of internal migrants were female, and 49 % male. Khan et al (2003:11), drawing on data from the Agincourt survey, report that ‘an average of one in five adult women temporarily migrate in 2000, and that proportion possibly increasing.’ They also found that labour migration of women between 35-54 years old increased steadily from 15% before 1997 to 25% in 2000, and that the amount of female migrants between 15-34 years increased from 5% before 1997 to 17% in 2000’(Khan et al 2003:9).<sup>3</sup>

#### Age

Posel and Casale (2003:5) report that 61.6% of all male migrants and 64.3% of female migrants were in the age group from 25-44 in 1999. Kok et al(2003:53), again using 1996 census data, found that 13% of the South African population that had ever migrated across district boundaries was between 0-19 years; 32% were between 20-39 years, 34% were between 40-59 and 28% were 60 or older. In Gauteng, nearly half of the population older than 20 had migrated across

district boundaries (45% of those aged 20-39; 47% of those aged 40-59 and 44% of those older than 60). Those aged between 15 and 44 were especially prone to migration, with a peak in the 25 to 29 age group (Kok et al 2003:55). Comparing the 1996 census data to older data, they also found that there is much continuity in this age-specific pattern since the late 1970s (Kok et al 2003:57).

### Skills and occupations

Using data from the 2001–02 HSRC Migration Survey, Wentzel et al (2006: 186) found that nearly half of all internal migrants (44% of internal migrants) worked as unskilled, manual labourers, followed by 12 % as semi-skilled, operator, driver and 11% as middle and lower level professional, semi-professional and inspectional. They also found that 40 % of internal migrants were employed at the time of the study, as opposed to 30% of non-migrants. In terms of income, 35% of internal migrants reported that they had no income, as opposed to 39% of non-migrants. 32% of internal migrants reported that they earned between R1 and R1000 per month (opposed to 39% of non-migrants) (Wentzel et al 2006:185,187). Data from the 2002 Agincourt survey provides the following skills profiles for temporary migrants: Females in the age between 15-29 most commonly worked as farm workers (18%), followed by working as domestic workers, small business assistants, small business owners, commercial cleaners or as informal vendors. Those in the age between 30-49 mostly also mostly worked as farm workers (17.2%), followed by working as commercial cleaners or small business owners. Amongst those female temporary migrants in the age group of 50-64, most worked as commercial cleaners (22.1%), followed by working as farm workers, small business owners or domestic workers. For male temporary migrants in the age between 15-29, the three most common occupations were farm work, construction work and artisanal work (11.6, 11.4 and 11.1% respectively). Those in the age group from 30-49 most commonly worked as miners (13.2%), followed by doing artisanal work, construction work or being a driver. Finally, male temporary migrants in the age group of 50-64 years most commonly did artisanal work (14%), followed by being a driver or a miner. Across all age groups and sexes, the percentage of those having a professional/managerial, health sector or teaching occupation was 4 % or lower.

### Migration patterns


Cross et al (2009:17) report that in South Africa ‘migration overall includes both oscillating labour migration and commutation as well as permanent or long-term residential migration and various forms of temporary stays.’ Existing studies show that although there is some evidence that circular migration patterns are declining in some places (as was commonly expected for the post 1994 era), circular patterns of migration within South Africa are still prevalent in many areas. Mosoetsa’s study of a low-income urban community located in the province of KwaZulu-Natal found that due to retrenchments and wide-spread unemployment the main income for many poor households no longer derives from wage labour but from state grants, resulting in a decline of migration (Mosoetsa 2004:8,9). This, so she argues, is a phenomenon that extends beyond the site she studies as well (Mosoetsa 2004:8). Other studies however indicate that temporary out-migration is not only still present but is actually increasing (Collinson et al 2003, Collinson et al 2009:8, Khan et al 2003:9, Posel and Casale 2006:352). Collinson et al (2009) highlight how beyond the fact that these patterns are historically entrenched it is important to note that the continuing link and movement between the migrant and his rural home also acts as a form of ‘insurance’ (for example to protect against shocks in insecure times; to care for children or provide a place to return to in the case of illness such as HIV/AIDS)(see also Welaga 2006:3).



Although rural-urban migration still constitutes a huge proportion of internal mobility, Singh (2005:13,114) highlights an increase in migration ‘to smaller towns, semi-urban areas, other rural areas and to peri-urban sites.’ Casale and Posel (2003:6) report that in 1995, 54% of internal migrants moved towards rural and semi-urban areas. Data from the Agincourt survey showed a predominance of rural-rural migration patterns, where those migrants moving from one rural village to another accounted for 71%; those moving to a rural town for 15% and those moving to the city for 6%’(Collinson et al 2003:7-8).

Source and destination areas

As Gindrey’s (2009) map (based on 2001 Census data) below shows, the extent of migration within and between various areas in South Africa differs significantly (Polzer 2010:2-3). Wenzel et al (2006:184), using the 2001–02 HSRC Migration Survey data, report that 25% of all internal migrants originated from Gauteng province, 14 % originated from the Eastern Cape and Kwazulu-Natal respectively, and 13% originated from North-West Province. 11 % originated from the Western Cape and Mpumalanga respectively, 6% from the Free State, 4% from Limpopo and 2% from the Northern Cape. The Province of Gauteng is South Africa’s smallest yet richest and most densely populated province, estimated to contribute over 33% to South Africa’s GDP and about 10% of the GDP of the entire African continent (Gauteng Provincial Government 2005:10, Gauteng Tourism Authority 2010). Gauteng attracts the highest numbers of migrants. Despite significant out-migration, it still had a net gain of about 262,000 people in 2001/02. In 2001, 11% of Johannesburg’s residents (the country’s hub for both internal and international migrants and capital of Gauteng province) were internal migrants that had arrived within the previous 5 years (Landau 2007:64). The 2007 Community Survey found that 18% of Gauteng’s inhabitants had moved within the Province since 2001. Waller (2006:2) reports that the movement of professional migrants within the country ‘is generally towards and between Gauteng, the Western Cape and KwaZulu-Natal.’



## 1.2: IMPACT OF INTERNAL MIGRATION ON THE MIGRANT

Few studies exist on the impacts of internal migration on the migrant him or herself. This section presents some anecdotal evidence of impacts on health, housing, living conditions and remittance sending behaviour, however, this will only be able to provide a few glimpses into an as of yet largely under-researched field.

### Remittance sending behaviour and employment

Cornwell and Inder (2004:16), using data from the 1993 and 1994 Statistics South Africa October Household Survey, found that even when controlling for educational biases (i.e., the likelihood that migrants are more highly educated in the first place), recent rural-urban migrants are 'remarkably successful in avoiding unemployment outcomes.' They further report that the chance that migrants will find formal employment are higher than average (2004:17) and that migrants are likely to be more accepting of jobs in the informal sector if no formal employment can be secured (Cornwell and Inder 2004:17). The Agincourt Survey data from 2002 showed that two thirds of all temporary migrants were employed in paid work, of which two thirds send remittances to rural households at home (Collinson et al 2003:12). Collinson et al (2003:12) also found that 'the work type that shows the highest odds of remitting is mining, followed by game farm work, waiting, driving, cleaning and artisan work. The higher paid jobs, like health sector employment, teaching, professional and managerial work showed the same odds of remitting as farm labourers.'

### Impacts on health, settlement patterns, housing and food security

A 2008 household survey of 487 migrants found that internal migrants tend to move towards informal settlements in the urban periphery, whereas international migrants tend to move towards inner city areas (Vearey et al 2010:697). The survey found that related to this settlement pattern, internal migrants tend to be worse off than international migrants residing in the inner city and have comparatively worse access to basic services. The households of internal migrants are also likely to have more children and inadequate housing (Vearey et al 2010: 700). Finally, internal migrants residing in the urban periphery 'are more likely to be without an income, rely on informal, survivalist livelihood strategies and experience food insecurity' (Vearey et al 2010: 700).

Several studies have found that internal migrants and their partners at home are at a particularly high risk to contract HIV (Collinson 2009:9,10, Kahn et al 2003, Lurie 2004:2). A study of 260 men and 228 women from two rural districts in the province of KwaZulu-Natal carried out between 1998 and 2000 found that the prevalence of HIV among migrants and their partners was significantly higher than among non-migrants and their partners (24.0% versus 15.0%, respectively) (Lurie 2004:2). A study by Bärnighausen et al (2007, quoted in Vearey 2010:7) found that the risk for internal migrants to become infected with HIV is almost double than it is for non-migrants, even when controlling for factors such as education, income or age. In terms of the perceptions that internal migrants have about their own health, Roux and van Tonder (2006:142), drawing on the 2000 South African Migration and Health Survey, found that less than half of the migrants felt that their health situation improved after they moved (Roux and van Tonder 2006:143), with men being 40 % less likely to think so than women. 71% of rural-urban migrants indicated that medical access was better, whereas only about 40% of urban-urban migrants had indicated better medical access post-migration.

Importantly, Vearey (2011:125) points out that the increased health risks for migrants are not due to migration as such, as migrants generally tend to be young (i.e. at a productive age) and healthy,

but are the result of an 'inability to access positive social determinants of health'. These include, amongst others, food security, adequate housing, access to safe drinking water, access to health care, secure livelihood activities as well as social networks and support. As Vearey points out, these determinants are all affected by broader social, economic, political and institutional conditions, resulting 'in differential exposures to health-damaging conditions, differential vulnerabilities to illness, and differential consequences of ill-health' for migrants (Vearey 2011:126).

#### Lessons learnt

- The chance of an internal migrant finding employment in the formal sector is higher than average. Internal migrants are more likely to accept any type of employment, even in the informal sector, in order not to be unemployed. This is likely to be due to factors at the micro-level, i.e., the extraordinary motivation of migrants and the planning, preparation and commitment that goes into both the move and the job-search at destination (see Cornwell and Inder 2004:17).
- Linked in many ways to residence in the urban periphery, the households of internal migrants are more likely to be worse off than households of international migrants in terms of income, housing, food security and access to services. This is likely to be due predominantly to macro level factors: On the one hand, these types of moves can be explained by taking into account the historically entrenched spatial logic of the apartheid system that kept Black labour resident in townships far outside of the cities. On the other hand, the structural poverty and high crime levels endemic in South Africa cause internal migrants to move towards these areas because they are often still seen as safer when compared to urban areas, offer access to natural resources such as fire wood and thus constitute comparatively low-cost areas that are still well connected with the city through affordable public transport (see Singh 2005). On the downside, these areas are relatively worse off in terms of living conditions, negatively impacting on migrants' health.
- The risk for internal migrants to become infected with HIV is almost double than it is for non-migrants, even when controlling for factors such as education, income or age. This is likely to be due to a combination of factors located at micro level (personal choices relating to sexual relationships and condom use), meso level (reconfigurations/disruptions of broader social and sexual networks and community settings) and macro level (poverty, overall levels of infectious disease, lack of access to proper shelter, sanitation and access to healthcare).

#### 1.3/1.4: IMPACT OF INTERNAL MIGRATION ON FAMILY MEMBERS

Few studies exist on the impacts of internal migration on family members. This section will present the limited evidence there is of impacts of remittances, on children in migrant-sending households and on the health of members of migrant-sending household. Yet, similarly to the previous section, this again is a largely under-researched field.

#### Impact of remittances

Evidence on the impact of internal migration through the sending of remittances on the income and household well being of family members back home is conflicting. Rwelamira and Kirsten (2003:1), drawing on data from a household survey covering 5852 households in 24 villages and conducted in the Limpopo Province of South Africa in 1999/2000, found that remittances

constitute a significant one third (32%) of the total income of rural households, with only salary and wage earnings constituting a higher proportion at 46%. Also acknowledging the substantial share that remittances play in total household income, Collinson et al (2009:28) report that within the 2001-2005 Agincourt survey data, 'households that have lost temporary migrants of either sex, through retrenchment or death, have a significantly higher risk of being chronically poor.' Drawing on the same dataset, Kok and Collinson (2006:1) found a positive correlation between household asset ownership and having at least one migrant amongst one's household members. Drawing on data from the KwaZulu-Natal Income Dynamics Survey (KIDS), Nagarajan's study found that remittance-receiving households are able to spend more on food and health and that remittances allow poorer households access to higher quality medical care.

Yet, when it comes inter-household comparisons, several studies have found that migrant-sending households tend to be worse off, and more likely to be ultra-poor, than those who do not send migrants (Posel and Casale 2006:357). However, as Posel and Casale (2006:360) point out, it is unknown whether this is due to migration and how these households would have fared without migration. Yet, regardless of these qualifications, they state that 'there is little evidence that migration has been effective in lifting rural African households out of poverty' (Posel and Casale 2006:361).

#### Impact on children in migrant-sending households

Lu and Treiman (2007:45), using cross-sectional data from the 1993-1994 Integrated Household Survey and panel data from 2002 and 2003 South African Labour Force Survey found that children of migrant-sending households are more likely to be enrolled in school, even when controlling for other factors. They also found that remittances contribute to reducing both gender inequalities within the household as well as inter-household inequalities (Lu and Treimann 2007:45). A study by Collinson (2006:103) found that the migration of women does not negatively affect the chances of child survival.

#### Impact on health of members of migrant-sending household

Lurie (2004:3) found that the prevalence of HIV amongst women with migrant partners was 21.1%, as opposed to 16.5% of women with non-migrant partner (see also Lurie et al 2003). Complicating the common assumption that it is the migrant who returns home and infects a partner - and that migration only reconfigures social and sexual networks for the partner who is mobile - Lurie et al (2003) found that in about one third of couples of a male migrating partner and a female partner who stayed at home, it was the female who was infected whereas the male migrant partner was not (see also Lurie 2006).

#### Lessons learnt

- Migrant-sending households tend to be worse off than those who do not send migrants; however, the reason is yet to be explored due to lack of data.
- There is little evidence that remittances are able to lift households out of poverty. This is likely to be due to factors at the macro level, i.e. structural poverty that cannot be overcome by the efforts of individuals alone.
- Children of migrant-sending households are more likely to be enrolled in school. This is likely to be due to a combination of factors at the micro and meso level: There is increased income

available for expenses beyond food and thus for education, while the need for children to work is reduced. Both of these factors seem to mitigate the negative effects of an absent parent (see Lu and Treiman 2007:45).

- The migration of women does not negatively affect the chances of child survival. This occurs despite strong structural restraints at macro levels, such as HIV/AIDS mortality and poverty and. at the micro-level, family disruption (see Collinson 2006:103). However, the exact reason is unknown.
- The prevalence of HIV amongst women with migrant partners is higher than that of women with non-migrant partners. In about one third of couples where the male partner was the migrant and the female partner stayed at home, it was the latter that was infected whereas the male migrant partner was not. More research is needed to explore how this comes about, however, it is likely that it is due to a combination of factors located at micro level (personal choices relating to sexual relationships and condom use), meso level (reconfigurations/disruptions of broader social and sexual networks and community settings) and macro level (poverty, overall levels of infectious disease, lack of access to proper shelter, sanitation and access to healthcare).

#### 1.5: IMPACT ON COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT

As IOM and SAMP (2005:9) highlight, 'one of the broader recommendations stemming from the literature is for migration to be researched as a process that affects 'communities' rather than as a description of individuals.' However, no studies were found on the impacts of internal migration in terms of development of local infrastructure and social involvement/participation in community organisations.

#### 1.6: IMPACTS ON LOCAL ECONOMY

Given the fact that mobility within the country is numerically much more significant than cross-border migration and that destination and sending areas vary across the country, internal migration poses a number of challenges regarding service provision, employment creation and social cohesion, especially for *local* government (Polzer 2010:2-3, Landau and Wa Kabwe Segatti 2009:3,16). Different areas are differently affected by migration. However, the ability of local government to accurately assess and plan according to mobility patterns and service use is severely limited due to a severe lack of data on internal migration patterns in South Africa (Oosthuizen and Naidoo 2004:42). As Landau and Wa Kabwe Segatti (2009:39) explain, 'infrastructure and social service planning requires long-term investments based on predictions of population in five to fifteen years time. Without reliable estimates, cities are unable to prepare for their population's future needs.'

Oosthuizen and Naidoo (2004:44) have nonetheless ventured onto the rather slippery ground of providing a number of estimates for Gauteng's future service provision needs. They estimate that, 'the average annual net increase in the Gauteng population due to in-migration would require the establishment of twenty new primary and ten new secondary schools annually.' Regarding health services, Oosthuizen and Naidoo (2004:45) estimate 'assuming no current over-capacity of clinics in the province, the average annual inflow of 159 000 in-migrants from other parts of South Africa if continued after 2001 would necessitate the establishment of 16 new clinics in the province annually.' Importantly, estimations like Oosthuizen's and Naidoo's (as well as arguments put forward by government officials and the general public about how the influx of especially international migrants will 'drain' or even 'collapse' health services) need to be qualified in several

different ways. Firstly, migrants generally tend to be 'positively selected', i.e. they tend to be young (i.e. at a productive age) and healthy at the time of migration (Vearey 2011:125). Secondly, while we know that migrants are exposed to increased health risks in urban areas, evidence shows that it is not in these urban areas that they usually seek access to health services when they are ill and in need of care or dying, but in their rural areas of origin (Vearey 2010:2). Evidence suggests that this applies for both internal as well as cross-border migrants. Thirdly, the underlying assumption here is based on an overly simplistic model of migration, assuming a permanent move instead of circular and temporary mobility (which, as most evidence shows, is the prevalent form within as well as to the country), thus again lowering the chances that services are accessed in urban areas alone or even at all. Evidence also shows that claims that migrants move in order to access health services in the city are unsubstantiated (Vearey 2010:13). Thus, rather than assuming that the 'burden' of migrant influx will always and only be on already overstretched services within urban areas, there is an urgent need to develop approaches to planning that are 'spatially sensitive' (Vearey 2011:126; 2010:2) and take into account the particular characteristics of migrants and their translocal trajectories that continuously oscillate between urban and rural areas, both within and beyond the country.

In terms of the varied impacts of brain/gain processes at local levels, we only have studies on Gauteng to look at. The province receives large numbers of unskilled and lowly educated internal migrants, but has also been successful in attracting many professionals from across the country (Waller 2006:2). Oosthuizen and Naidoo (2004:43) report that despite the fact that migrants to Gauteng constitute 'less than 38 per cent of the SA-born population of the province, they account for almost half of the 590,000 residents with higher education.' While this causes a brain drain in other areas of the country and particularly from rural areas, Gauteng experiences a brain gain as the number of highly educated people in the provincial labour market increases, rendering it much less 'skills-constrained' than many other parts of the country. Oosthuizen and Naidoo (2004:45) note as well that while in-migration places increased demand on health services provided by Gauteng province, the influx of skilled health care workers from other parts of the country might also form part of the solution to the skills shortage problem in Gauteng's health sector (Oosthuizen and Naidoo:2004 :45). (Of course, as the skills shortage of healthcare professionals is a countrywide problem, this in turn affects the sending-areas negatively again). The effect of remittances is similarly ambivalent – cash sent out of Gauteng technically takes away from its economy, while benefiting that of the receiving provinces. Three quarters of remittances sent in cash are sent to only three provinces: Limpopo, the Eastern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal. Remittances sent in-kind on the other hand benefit Gauteng's economy (Oosthuizen and Naidoo 2004:43).

#### 1.7: IMPACT OF INTERNAL MIGRATION ON NATIONAL ECONOMY

The South African economy has been founded on elaborate systems of spatial segregation and migration control. While formal controls began to erode in the late 1980s, the populations racial-spatial divisions continue to shape how South Africans live and how they move. In many areas, the poorest areas are former 'homelands' and townships, spaces that were intentionally underdeveloped during the apartheid era to provide labour reserves for white owned industries and businesses. Under these circumstances, many families rely on a combination of remittances and state grants for social reproduction (Veary et al 2010). Conversely, many people forgo family support networks to move to a city in search of economic improvement.

While little has been written on the aggregate effects of these movements, they are nevertheless critical to the country's socio-spatial development. The large-scale movement of people into the country's economic and industrial hubs (Gauteng, Cape Town, Durban, and Port Elizabeth)

provide much needed labour although these moves are often unable to provide much needed skills. The benefits of such movements are, however, compromised by local authorities' relative inability to plan for these movements. Moreover, as noted throughout this report, health and housing policy tends to work against the ready economic and social integration of migrants and their families in new communities (Landau 2007, Landau et al forthcoming).

#### 1.8: IDENTIFICATION OF RESEARCH GAPS

The most acute gap in existing research is the lack of reliable data on internal mobility. Our knowledge of the types as well as patterns of mobility within the country is extremely limited in its capacity to inform policies aimed at poverty reduction, provision of social services, or employment creation. There is an urgent need to cover migration and migration histories in much finer detail within the South African census and other instruments.

Given the evidence of a diversification of the types of places people migrate to and growing occurrence of rural-rural migration, there is also a need to divert some attention away from rural-urban mobility in order to understand why and how these types of patterns emerge, what benefits they could bring and how their negative impacts might be mitigated. At the moment, the smallest unit captured in the census is the magisterial district, missing out on capturing the finer nuances that the literature describes, for example the village-to-village migration documented in Collinson et al (2003:7-8). In order to be able to appropriately assess the impacts of migration on migrants, receiving as well as sending areas and households, there is an urgent need for more panel data. At the moment, it is impossible to tell whether households are poorer because of migration, or if they were poorer to begin with: As Posel and Casale (2006:19) point out, with such data we would be able ‘

to compare the same households before and after migration, and track changes in economic well-being among migrant and non- migrant households (...) [and to] get closer to understanding *when*, or under what conditions, migrant households display downward mobility and when migration may be successful in lifting households out of poverty.

Moving away from these basic considerations with data and migration patterns yet still closely related to these concerns, there is a vital need to understand more about the link between HIV, migration, different patterns of mobility and the effects not only on the migrant and partners at home, but the broader sending and receiving communities as well (Lurie et al 2003). Recent research has challenged the common assumption that it is the migrant him or herself that infects rural partners, yet few research has been conducted on ‘both ends of migration routes’, which ‘is essential if targeted interventions are to be successfully implemented (Lurie 2006:651). Similarly, as Vearey (2010, 2011) points out, it is important to understand better how rural-urban links and mobility patterns impact on health and the ways migrants access health services. Also, the livelihood strategies and links with rural homes of migrants need to be re-conceptualised not as unit-directional but bi-directional in their creation of *translocal* households (Rogan et al 2009:19-20). Lubkemann (2000:47,49) for example reports that many of the Mazachian Mozambicans whose trajectories he studied pursued a ‘total social life’ in both South Africa and Mozambique through transnational marriages, being married to two or more different women in different countries. These migrants thus maintain and invest in social relations and households in multiple places in order to maintain their social status and create a safety system in times of economic hardship. Finally, there are few studies on the relatively recent increase in female, internal migration; on the implications of migration for children and elderly people in sending households and on the impacts on community development in terms of infrastructure or investment or participation in community organisations. We also don't know how recent internal migration

impacts community development in social terms, for example in the sense of reconfigurations of social (other than sexual) structures (for example families or gender relations and roles), networks and identities; or how the absence of parents in their function as role models impacts communities as a whole (Landau and Vigneswaran 2007:8).

## **SECTION 2: SHORT TERM CONTRACT INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION**

### **2.1: OVERVIEW ON RECENT SHORT TERM CONTRACT INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION TRENDS OF THE COUNTRY**

During the Apartheid era, short-term contract migration (predominantly to the mines) constituted the only form of legal African international migration to South Africa.<sup>4</sup> Contract migration has significantly decreased since the end of the 1980s due to a reduced need for labour in the South African gold mines as well as the opening up of various other kinds of migration opportunities, both documented and undocumented, since the end of the Apartheid state. However, temporary contract migration continues to exist, albeit in much smaller volumes. Besides the mining sector, both the agricultural as well as the construction sector in South Africa also have high demand for flexible, short term and/or seasonal labour which many cross-border migrants continue to provide (IOM 2010c, Araia et al 2010:). Another sector worth mentioning is the hospitality sector.<sup>5</sup> While some of this temporary work is legal in the classical sense of contract migration, there is however evidence of increasing irregularisation and informalisation (i.e., migrants working without proper work contracts which are subsequently particularly vulnerable to exploitation and abuse (Crush et al 1999, Araia et al 2010).

#### Mining sector

In South Africa, contract migration is most prominently associated with the country's mining sector. The system of temporary contract migration to the mines has been in place in South Africa since the late 19<sup>th</sup> century and, although slightly modified and smaller in overall volumes, continues to exist. Crush and Williams (2010:9) report that due to the enormous benefits of having cheap, flexible labour available the 'mining companies resisted all pressures to move away from hiring migrants and even abandoned plans to expand family housing, citing the cost crisis in the industry.' Foreign mine workers have always constituted a huge share of the overall labour force on the mines, and are predominantly cross-border migrants from four neighbouring countries: Mozambique, Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland. These migrant contract workers still tend to be almost exclusively male. Interestingly though, while the labour force from Swaziland used to be exclusively male, Swazi women began to work in the mines as well from the year 2001 onwards (IOM 2010b:9). As Crush and McDonald (2001:7) describe, the contract system is still based legally on bilateral treaties between South Africa and the respective countries dating back over 40 years. Workers are also still recruited through the Employment Bureau of Africa (TEBA) and are on one-year renewable contracts (IOM 2010b:8). However, although to a lesser degree than in the agricultural and construction sector, there is evidence of increasing processes of sub-contracting within the mining sector by private brokers (Crush et al 1999).

In the end of the 1980s and early 1990s, gold prices stagnated and major waves of retrenchments in the mines followed. In 1990, 176,663 international migrant workers were employed in the mines and foreigners constituted 47 % of the overall work force. Ten years later, in 2000, the number had reduced to 131,112. However, foreigners now constituted 57% of the overall work force – while round about 100,000 South African jobs were lost over the 10-year period from 1990-2000, less than half of this amount – 45,551 – of foreign jobs was lost. Since 2001 the gold



price then appreciated again, resulting in an increase in employment levels (Crush et al 2010:13). However, after reaching the peak of 57% in 2000, the percentage of foreign labour within the overall work force began to drop again. In 2006, foreign jobs only accounted for 38% of the overall work force, and the number of foreign workers had reduced to 102,905. Importantly, these downsizing processes very differently affected the various nationalities. Mineworkers from Lesotho used to be the largest group of foreign workers and have been hit particularly hard by the retrenchments. For workers from Lesotho, numbers dropped from 99,707 in 1990s to 46,082 in 2006). For workers from Botswana, numbers dropped from 14,609 in 1990 to 2,992 in 2006. For workers from Swaziland, numbers dropped from 17,757 in 1990 to 7,124 in 2006). Workers from Mozambique on the other hand were hardly affected at all, with strikingly similar numbers (44,590 in 1990 and 46,707 in 2006) being employed (Crush and Williams 2010:11 using TEBA data). IOM (2010b:9) estimates that the percentage of foreign labour within the entire mining sector is currently as high as 60%.

#### Agricultural sector

Migrants also work on commercial farms, especially in those provinces bordering the surrounding countries: Mpumalanga and Limpopo (border areas with Mozambique and Zimbabwe) and the Eastern Free State (border area with Lesotho) (Crush et al 2000). While some migrants are permanently employed, many work on a temporary or seasonal basis (IOM 2010a). An IOM 2009 study of farm workers in Mpumalanga found that 'the farming community surveyed comprised a predominantly seasonal (71%), female (65%), and young workforce (77% in 18–39-year age bands) of mainly unskilled general workers (97%) who are very low-income earners' (IOM 2010a:8).

#### Construction sector

The once-off nature of most construction projects requires flexible labour that can be hired easily and laid off just as quickly. It is a type of employment that in itself 'creates a process of circular migration whereby migrant workers return home once their job is completed, returning to job-sites only when new work is available' (IOM 2010c:7). Although there is evidence that construction companies increasingly hire South African workers, demand for foreign labour – both managerial/skilled/technical and semi-skilled or unskilled - is still high (IOM 2010c:7). Unskilled or semi-skilled workers are often hired through sub-contractors and/or move around from construction sites to construction sites in search for work. For this group of workers, obtaining valid work permits is virtually impossible, leaving these migrant workers largely undocumented and as such unprotected (IOM 2010c:7). An earlier study by Rogerson (1999:3), who interviewed almost 70 foreign construction workers, found that migrants working in the South African construction sector come predominantly from four countries only: Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Swaziland and Botswana – with Mozambicans being the most dominant. In his study, 60% of migrants were younger than 25, 58% were unmarried and their formal education levels were lower than that of other migrant groups. Importantly, over 75% admitted that they did not have legitimate documentation (Rogerson 1999:4). Based on a more recent study Araia et al (2010) point out, that by now Zimbabweans seem to be the most dominant group amongst foreign construction workers, likely due to the recent increased influx from that country. In their study of 120 construction workers in the Braamfontein and Rosebank areas of Johannesburg they also found that that foreign nationals earned an average of R137.36 a day (Araia, et al, 2010:29). While this is below minimum wage, it does not appear that migrant workers are extraordinarily exploited. However, the study is too small to infer broader implications.

## 2.2: IMPACT OF SHORT TERM CONTRACT INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION ON THE MIGRANT

### Lack of worker's rights and benefits

Processes of sub-contracting and labour brokerage within the mining sector by private brokers increase worker's vulnerability, leaving many of them with 'short contracts with few (if any) benefits, little security, and meagre pay' (Crush and McDonald 2000:5). As IOM (2010c:8) reports, similar forms of sub-contracting - and all the same negative effects on migrant workers - are evident in the construction sector. Araia et al's (2010:6) study of construction workers also found that 'neither subcontracted nor directly employed workers were guaranteed basic labour rights such as sick leave or UIF.' Strikingly, even of the employed respondents a mere 13% received both sick leave and UIF. In the agricultural sector, employment is also very often informal and many workers do not receive any benefits. Importantly, 'in the case of mistreatment, these workers have no legal basis with which to make a claim against their employer.' Due to bilateral agreements between South Africa and Lesotho, nearly all Basotho migrants working on farms do have contracts - a stark contrast to other national groups. However, even with a contract there is evidence that these migrants are not safe from abuse by their employers (IOM 2010b:13).

### Vulnerability to HIV

The literature on migration and HIV in South and Southern Africa tends to rehearse much of global presumptions about ties between illness and mobility. Most authors argue that the negative social, economic and working conditions that temporary labour migrants in all sectors find themselves increase vulnerability to HIV (IOM 2010a, IOM 2010b, IOM 2010c). In all sectors, migrants are separated from their families and spouses/partners for several months at a time or longer, often causing a re-configuration of sexual relationships. Accommodation is often overcrowded, hygienic conditions poor, the pay meagre and limited recreational activities available (IOM 2010a, IOM 2010b, IOM 2010c). Due to the often isolated location of the site of work (for example, rural farms far away from a clinic) migrants have very limited access to health care facilities, and all sectors have attracted the presence of sex workers. For agricultural workers, the 'no work no pay policy' applies, causing migrants to delay or completely avoid the treatment of an illness rather than being absent from work (IOM 2010a:12).

Then, there are health impacts specific to particular sectors. In the construction sector, workers operate in difficult and dangerous working environments and are at constant risk of physical injuries. (IOM 2010c:7). Working and living conditions in the mines on the other hand are humid and poorly ventilated, and thus lung diseases including tuberculosis (TB) as well as silicosis are exceptionally prevalent. As the AIDS and Rights Alliance for Southern Africa (ARASA 2008:2) reports, 'the South African government estimates that the TB incidence rates on gold mines are probably the highest in the world.' In addition, mine workers are exposed to dangerous working conditions; generally poor living conditions; and work in an environment that fosters strong masculine identities and encourages alcohol use as well as high levels of sexual activity. All of these conditions render mineworkers highly vulnerable to HIV infection (Campbell 2003, IOM 2010b:10,11). With regards to the agricultural sector, IOM (2010) reports that 'farm workers in South Africa's Limpopo and Mpumalanga provinces have the highest HIV prevalence among any working population in Southern Africa'. IOM (2010a:9) also found that female farm workers are especially vulnerable to HIV infection, also due to various forms of sexual exploitation. IOM (2010a, 2004) for example reports of instances of transactional sex in exchange for food or clothing, or instances where female workers had to provide 'sexual favours' to supervisors in order to get their contracts renewed. Although such social and health consequences are undoubtedly present in people's lives, work by Vearey (as cited in section 1) and others suggests

that there is not a direct relationship between migration and health and that further empirical research is needed. That so much of the current research is driven by those intending to develop programmes to assist migrants gives further cause to question its objectivity.

#### 2.3/2.4: IMPACT ON FAMILY MEMBERS

The nature of infectious diseases such as tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS naturally puts families, spouses as well as home communities at risk. (AIDS and Rights Alliance for Southern Africa 2008:11-12). IOM (2010b) also reports that the spouses of migrant workers are particularly vulnerable to HIV.

The significant dependence on remittances sent by mineworkers creates major problems for households back home when a miner becomes disabled, injured or ill – all occurrences that are highly likely given the social and physical conditions in the mines (IOM 2010b:12, Crush and Williams 2005:10).

Studies on the impacts on remittances rarely specify whether the migrant who sends them is employed in short-term contract or other types of formal or informal employment. General studies on the impacts on remittances will be discussed in section 3 on cross-border migration.

#### Lessons learnt

- The spouses of migrant mine workers are particularly vulnerable to HIV infection. This is likely to be due to a combination of factors located at micro level (personal choices relating to sexual relationships and condom use), meso level (reconfigurations/disruptions of broader social and sexual networks as well as gender norms resulting in an economically and socially weaker position of the female partner) and macro level (poverty, overall levels of infectious disease, lack of access to proper shelter, sanitation and access to healthcare).

#### 2.5: IMPACT ON COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT

Similarly to the previous section on internal migrants, there are no studies available on the impacts of short-term international contract migration on community development.

#### 2.6: IMPACTS ON LOCAL ECONOMY

While we know little about *actual* impacts of migrant labour at a local level, we know that a powerful anti-foreign discourse is prevalent that constructs the presence of foreign workers as detrimental to South African communities and local economies. Often, migrants are accused to 'steal' jobs, opportunities, housing and even women 'rightfully belonging' to South African locals only. A study of residents in informal settlements across the country in the aftermath of the May 2008 attacks against foreign nationals in South Africa found that 'most residents strongly believe that the presence of foreign nationals in their communities is a primary cause of challenges to their economic and physical well-being'(Misago et al 2010:36). The November 2009 events in the wine farming area of de Doorns are a clear example of how xenophobic discourse translates into violent action at the local level: South African residents of de Doorns accused Zimbabwean migrants of 'cheating' them out of work at the wine farms by accepting lower wages, as well as Zimbabwean contractors of taking away business from South Africans. It is estimated that about 3000 Zimbabweans were displaced, many of whom had their dwellings looted and destroyed (Misago 2009:2).

## 2.7: IMPACTS ON NATIONAL ECONOMY

While data on remittance flows in the Southern African region is virtually unavailable, Mozambique and Lesotho form the exception to this rule. This is due to the fact that both countries have long-standing systems of 'compulsory deferred pay' for contract mineworkers in South Africa in order to guarantee that a substantial part of their citizens' earnings is spent in the home countries. Thus, migrant remittances flow through official channels and can be recorded. The Southern African Migration Project (SAMP) estimates that remittances constituted 25% of Lesotho's entire GDP in 2006 (Crush et al 2010:1). Several other estimates put the share at an even higher amount: Kok et al (2006:40) even claim that remittances and deferred pay combined account for 51%. For Mozambique, remittances constituted a quarter of foreign exchange earnings in 1995 (Hughes et al 2007:32, de Vletter 1998:15). Needless to say this reliance on income derived migrant labour, creates extreme dependency at both household as well as national level, particularly in the case of Lesotho. As Hughes et al (2007:32) report, 'Mozambican miners are required to remit 60% of their income to Mozambique for six months of the year. This money can only be collected in Mozambique. Mineworkers from Lesotho are required to remit 30% of their income for ten months of the year (until 1990 they were required to remit 60%).' In Lesotho, the Deferred Pay Act has been in place since 1974. (Crush et al 2010:9). As Hughes et al (2007:32) report,

research has established that whilst this system is not popular with mineworkers, who feel it should be optional, it is overwhelmingly popular with their spouses, who fear a loss of income if the system is abandoned as the migrant could 'waste' the money. It is also supported by the Lesotho and Mozambican governments who have similar fears.

In addition to receiving funds and thus reviving their economies, migrant-sending countries are also exporting part of their own unemployment problems (Crush and Tshitereke (2001:56). Thus, both mining companies in South Africa (due to a need for flexible, short term labour) and the migrant-supplying states (due to a vested interest in receiving remittances) have no interest in ending such patterns of temporary migration any time soon (Crush and Tshitereke 2001:56).

## 2.8: IMPACT ON HOST COUNTRIES' ECONOMY AND SOCIETY

Given the long standing history of the contract migration system and reliance on the constant supply of flexible and cheap workers particularly from its northern neighbours, South Africa has always been shaped by migrant labour (Peberdy 2010:5) The mining, agricultural and construction sectors –all sectors within which migrants form large shares of the labour force - are all vital arteries of the South African economy, together accounting for over 20 % of the country's GDP.<sup>6</sup>

The broader social impacts of all international migrants, regardless of their type, on South African society will be addressed in section 3.8.

## 2.9: IDENTIFICATION OF RESEARCH GAPS

With the exception of those countries with system of compulsory deferred pay, national data on the volume of remittances are not available. Also, while there are many presumptions about the impacts of short-term international contract migration, we have little knowledge into the actual impacts of this type of migration on local communities and economies. This is an important gap to address. Other research gaps relating to both contract migrants and other types of cross-border migrants will be addressed in the end of the following section on cross border population movements.

## SECTION 3: CROSS BORDER POPULATION MOVEMENTS

### 3.1: OVERVIEW OF CROSS BORDER MIGRATION COUNTRY TRENDS

While South Africa has a long history of migration, the nature and balance between inward and outward flows and the types of populations who come and go have changed considerably since the end of the Apartheid state.<sup>7</sup> Until the early 1990s, with short interruptions due to various crises such as the uprising in Soweto in 1976, South Africa experienced net immigration gains (Mattes, et al 2000:10). However, legal immigration during this period was confined to white people whereas permanent immigration was prohibited for black people. Black migrant labourers had to return home as soon as their contract period ended. Since 1994, the trend towards white immigration has come to an end, while on the other hand, the number of (predominantly) white and skilled South Africans who are leaving the country has increased (Crush and Williams 2005:3). However, there is no accurate data on the number of people who have left South Africa. An estimation for the period of 1989 till 2003 by The Centre for Development and Enterprise (CDE) claimed over 520,000 South Africans had emigrated during that time (CDE cited in Polzer 2010:2-3). Whereas previously the migration of black people, both domestic and international was legally confined to temporary contract migration, the post-apartheid era has been characterised by increased volumes, higher diversity and different types of migrants. Prominently, while the system of contract migration continues to exist (albeit in much smaller volumes, as discussed in the previous section), non-contract migration increased significantly (McDonald 2000:814). South Africa now receives a vast array of different types of international migrants - skilled and unskilled, refugees, asylum seekers, 'forced' and 'economic'<sup>8</sup>, permanent and temporary migrants. People come to South Africa to work, to trade across borders, to do business, to study, to travel, to buy and sell goods and to seek refuge and protection – and to transit towards other places. Migrants come, as the title of Landau's paper goes, for 'passage, profit and protection'(Landau 2010, Landau and Wa Kabwe Segatti 2009:5). There is also evidence of growing numbers of unaccompanied minors as young as seven years old entering into South Africa (Landau and Wa Kabwe Segatti 2009:23). Save the Children (2007:4) reports that while numbers are impossible to state, their fieldwork and research showed 'sufficiently large numbers of children crossing borders unaccompanied to warrant major concern.'

Several trends are characteristic of post-apartheid international migration: the overall volume of migration has increased; migrants now come from a broader range of origins; there are various different types of migrants arriving; migrants tend to be younger and there are increasing amounts of female migrants on the move (Landau et al 2004:20, Landau and Wa Kabwe Segatti 2009:19). However, the majority of migrants are still male. A survey of more than 600 migrants in Johannesburg reached the same conclusion although sampling errors in this (and other) studies give cause to question their accuracy (Landau and Jacobsen 2004). However, while migrants now come from all over the world, the vast majority still originates from the African continent and in particular the Southern African region: Malawi, Mozambique, Lesotho, Swaziland, Botswana and Zimbabwe. South Africa is the top destination within what has been termed the 'Southern African Migration System.' A survey of 4,700 households across five Southern African countries found that 86% of all migrants surveyed worked in South Africa at the time of the study. Taking out Zimbabwean migrants of whom only 33% worked in South Africa at the time, the number of all migrants surveyed working in South Africa was even higher – 95% (Pendleton et al 2006:16). In terms of skills profiles, 'immigrants tend to be literate, usually multi-lingual, relatively highly educated, and overwhelmingly from urban origins as compared to South African internal migrants'(Singh 2005:118).

There are no reliable statistics available as per the exact numbers of international migrants in the country. Estimates within government, academic, research and media circles vary between 1 and 8 million international migrants. However, as Polzer points out, none of these are ‘based on solid evidence’(2010:2-3). Landau and Wa Kabwe-Segatti (2009:5) further argue that, ‘no one knows how many international migrants are in South Africa, how long they have been there, how long they stay, or what they do while they are in the country’(see also Cross et al 2009:19).

Several trends can be discerned:

First, in terms of overall volumes, it is important to highlight that international migration is much less significant than internal migration within South Africa (Polzer 2010:2-3). Second, due to the difficult and over the course of the last decade steadily deteriorating socio-economic situation in Zimbabwe, migrants from this country currently constitute the largest group of cross-border migrants in South Africa. While it is difficult to estimate accurately, Polzer (2010:2-3) puts the number of Zimbabweans in South Africa at between 1 and 1.5 million. Although much larger numbers are often cited in the media, these most definitely exaggerated claims need to be seen in context to estimations that put the total global Zimbabwean diaspora at only about 3 Million (a quarter of Zimbabwe’s total population) (Bracking and Sachikonye (2009:214), and the fact that there are also sizeable Zimbabwean populations in non-African countries, for example in the UK.

Third, we can gather some pointers towards numbers from the little official data that *is* actually captured regarding documented migration in South Africa: various types of permits issued, visits recorded or records of deportations (however, both visits and deportations recorded are misleading, as for example one person can make several visits and similarly one person may be deported several times and return afterwards). Thus, as Polzer (2010:2-3) rightly cautions, ‘these do not reflect broader migration trends.’ The following table is based on estimations made by Polzer(2010) from the African Centre for Migration and Society (ACMS) based on 2008/9 data from the South African Department of Home Affairs (DHA) and its own estimated projections based on census data:


Recognized refugees cumulative since 1994	47,596 (at end of 2009)
Recognized asylum seekers - new applicants in 2009	223,324 <sup>9</sup>
Economic migrants issued with individual work permits (not including corporate permits)	32,344 (2007/8)
People deported	312,733 (2007/8)
Total foreign population (including documented and undocumented)	Between 1.6 and 2 million, or 3-4% of the total national population
Census 2001: foreign-born population	1,025,072 or 23 % of the total population <sup>10</sup>
Total visits to South Africa*	1990: 1 million, 2000: 5.1 million
African visits to South Africa*	1990: 550,000, 2000: 4 Million
SADC visits to South Africa*	1990: 500,000, 2000: 3.7 Million

\*The numbers cited here reflect the number of times the border is crossed rather than the number of individual border crossers.

Fourth, the volumes of undocumented migration are even harder to assess and subsequently highly contested. Estimates still range from 2.5 to 12 million undocumented migrants (ILO 1998,

McDonald et al 2000:814). However, the most sound answer to the question of how many undocumented migrants are in the country is to say that the number is unknown. With regards to trafficking, Landau and Wa Kabwe Segatti (2009:9) report that ‘there is little evidence of widespread human trafficking into South Africa,’ an assertion confirmed by independent studies conducted by Richter and Fick 2008 (see also Richter and Monson 2010,).

Fifth, different groups of migrants are distributed in varied ways across the country. Landau and Wa Kabwe Segatti (2009:15) report that the provinces bordering neighbouring countries such as ‘Mpumalanga and Limpopo Provinces primarily host Mozambicans and Zimbabweans’ but that that ‘there is a far greater diversity of foreigners living in Durban and Cape Town including many more Zimbabweans, Mozambicans, Congolese and Angolans. Somalians are also present in all major cities and smaller towns, but in much smaller numbers.’ Furthermore, as Gindrey’s (2009) map below shows, the share of international migrants within the country’s different provinces also varies significantly.



Source: Gindrey with UN OCHA 2009

### 3.2 IMPACT OF CROSS BORDER MIGRATION ON THE MIGRANT

#### Access to health services

Both documented as well as undocumented foreign nationals as well as refugees are entitled to emergency health services in South Africa. Refugees are also entitled to the same basic free health services as South Africans are, whereas other types of migrants are required to pay a fee. However, the country’s constitution demands that they may not be refused treatment based on nationality. Nonetheless, there is evidence that migrants regardless of their legal status are frequently denied access to health services, or are being refused treatment or medication,

regardless of their legal entitlement to it. Migrants also frequently report abuse and discrimination by hospital staff. (Vearey and Nunez 2010, Landau and Wa-Kabwe Segatti 2009:41).

#### Employment and labour market

Many migrants also experience discrimination in the labour market and are 'often systematically excluded from employment and income generating opportunities through both formal and informal mechanisms. Many foreign citizens without the right to work—but with the skills and a willingness to do so—accept positions where they are paid below the minimum wage or work in inhumane conditions. Even those with employment rights report being turned away by employers who do not recognise their papers or their professional qualifications' (Landau and Wa Kabwe Segatti 2009:40). In Bloch's (2006) study of 500 Zimbabweans in South Africa, many respondents reported that they were not able to use the qualifications they had obtained previous to their migration - for example teaching degrees - in the South African labour market, resulting in a process of 'de-skilling', underemployment and 'downward occupational mobility'(Block 2006:75, 83). While there is a potentially huge pool of skilled labour available in Zimbabwe, Waller (2006:4) reports that South Africa 'has not seen a large influx of skilled Zimbabweans bolstering its professional workforce because (...) these migrants tend to abandon their professions and take up menial jobs.' In Bloch's study (2006:78), those who benefited the most from migration were undocumented migrants who had previously been unemployed in their home country but had now found employment as labourers in South Africa. She also found that unemployment rates were the highest amongst refugees and asylum-seekers. Furthermore, she found that undocumented Zimbabwean migrants 'were working for the most part as low-paid agricultural labourers in South Africa: in other words, working long hours and earning less than the minimum wage with no employment rights, in contrast to documented agricultural labourers.' Essentially, excluding migrants from formal labour markets and, through lack of access to proper documentation, forcing them into informal work without contracts and labour rights also undercuts South African worker's interest. This is because it lowers the price for labour in general, and thus makes South African workers less competitive.

#### Remittances

Hughes et al (2007:35) point out that there is also a downside to the sending of remittances for the migrant him or herself, as it may affect the quality of life for the migrant. He reports that data from the 2001 census:

indicates that SADC migrant households are least likely to own televisions, radios and refrigerators. That may be because they have been purchased in their home country, but also indicates that migrants may live materially restricted lives in their destination country in order to be able to send money home.

#### Lessons learnt

- Migrants regardless of their legal status are frequently denied access to health services, or are being refused treatment or medication, regardless of their legal entitlement to it. Migrants also frequently report abuse and discrimination by hospital staff. This is all largely due to pervasive xenophobia and discrimination of foreigners at micro, meso and macro levels of South African society.
- Many migrants experience discrimination in the labour market and are not able to use the qualifications they had obtained previous to their migration, resulting in de-skilling and



downward social mobility. This is all largely due to pervasive xenophobia and discrimination of foreigners at micro, meso and macro levels of South African society.

### 3.3/3.4: IMPACT ON FAMILY MEMBERS

#### Remittances

The amount of remittance flows from South Africa to (and that within) the region is difficult to estimate due to the fact that the majority of money is not sent through formal channels (Kok et al 2006:8). Maphosa (2007) studied the impacts of remittances sent by Zimbabwean migrants from South Africa to a rural area in Zimbabwe. His study sampled 150 households, of which 68.7% had at least one member of the household that migrated to South Africa. He found that remittances form a crucial part of the household's income and were mainly used to provide for basic needs of a household including food, shelter, clothes, education and health care. 78.8% of all households used cash remittances for school fees and 65 % used them for health care for cash remittances. 58.8% used them to buy livestock. 53.3% used remittances to build houses or purchase consumer goods. Less than a third (31.2%) invested remittances into agricultural production other than livestock, and only 10% of households stated that they invest remittances in formal businesses. He also found that virtually all households (98.8%) receive in-kind remittances in the form of food. (Maphosa 2007:130-131). A small qualitative study by Mukwedeya (2009) found that there was a predominance of in-kind remittances as opposed to cash remittances from Zimbabweans in South Africa. A household survey in Zimbabwe conducted from 2004-2005 including 723 randomly selected migrant-sending households found that remittances in Zimbabwe constituted the most important part of total household incomes (Tevera and Chikanda 2009:4). The study found that,

total expenses largely covered by remittances included gifts (93%), entertainment (92%), building (90%), clothes (88%), transportation (88%), education (88%), housing (85%), medical expenses (83 %) and food and groceries (80 %) (...) The most common use of remittances is to buy food (by 67% of households), buying clothing (49%) and paying for school fees (48%). Domestic building materials are another common expense (by 49 % of households) as are transportation costs (fuel and fares).

Compiling data from five Southern African countries (4,700 households in Botswana, Lesotho, Southern Mozambique, Swaziland and Zimbabwe between 2004 and 2005), Pendleton et al (2006:3) found that the most common expenditure items for remittance money are food (90% of households), school fees (52%), clothing (52%), and fares (transportation) (34%). Bracking and Sachikonye (2009:215) also found that in the urban sample they surveyed in Harare and Bulawayo, 'not only do a full 50 % of our households receive remittances, but it is clear that a substantial majority of these are dependent on them for essential household goods, including food.' A small qualitative study by Mukwedeya (2009:67) found that only about 20 % of cash remittances received are used for productive purposes. Acute food insecurity has 'forced people to focus on bread and butter issues ignoring the issue of investments' (Mukwedeya 1009:74).

None of the studies found much evidence of remittances being used in productive (as opposed to consumptive) ways. Pendleton et al (2006:7) state that 'remittances in cash and kind keep poverty at bay but they do not do much else. There is very little evidence, as yet, that remittances in Southern Africa have developmental value, as conventionally defined.'

### 3.5: IMPACT ON COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT IN HOME COUNTRY

Maphosa (2007:131) reports that in the sample he studied, apart from the occasional investment, there is only little evidence remittances being used for home community infrastructure or community organisations such as hospitals or sporting activities. No other studies on community development were found, similar to what has been described previously in section 1.5 and 2.5.

### 3.6: IMPACT ON LOCAL ECONOMY IN HOME COUNTRY

Maphosa (2007:131) reports that in the sample he studied, there was only very little evidence of any significant contribution to employment creation through the use of remittances. Bracking and Sachikonye (2009:215) also caution against too much 'euphoria' regarding the link between economic growth and poverty reduction. In their survey of 300 households in Harare and Bulawayo in 2005 they found that while the impact of remittances was positive in terms of keeping poverty for some households at bay, but simultaneously caused price inflation, exacerbated poverty for non-migrant sending households and increased inter-household inequalities. The study also found that 40 % of the very poorest households in their study did not receive remittances (2009:205-206).

### 3.7: IMPACT ON NATIONAL ECONOMY

#### Remittances

Gupta et al (2007) claim that a 10% increase in remittances reduces the level of poverty per capita at 1% reduction in sub-Saharan Africa (Gupta et al 2007 cited in Rocher and Pelletier 2008:5). Singh et al (2009:13) have pointed out the anti-cyclical, less volatile and as such 'shock absorbing' nature of remittances in Sub-Saharan Africa, meaning that when there is an economic downturn in the home countries, migrants usually remit more money in order to balance out this shock (see also de Haas 2010:249). However, Singh et al (2009:15) also found that the overall effect of remittances on economic growth in the home country is negative and significant. Their findings indicated that a 1% increase in the ratio between remittances and GDP would actually reduce the per capital GDP growth rate by 0.03% in Sub-Saharan Africa. According to them, even in the event that remittances might be able to reduce the volatility of consumption or alleviate financial constraints, 'the evidence would indicate that the combined effect of the resulting real appreciation of the exchange rate, the brain drain, or adverse incentives on labour force participation offsets these positive contributions'(Singh 2009:17-18, see also Chami et al 2005 for more on the link between remittance flows, development and economic growth).

There is little evidence from the studies reviewed here as well as from those from elsewhere that migrant remittances have much impact in addressing structural poverty beyond keeping poverty at bay in individual households (see Kapur 2003, de Haas 2010, 2007). In order to address this, Maphosa (2007:132) calls for policies to be put in place and better coordination between governments, migrants groups and other stakeholders to ensure that the flow of, and use of remittances for investment is encouraged. However, cautioning against a certain lack of realism underlying such perspectives, de Haas (2007:26) writes:

to expect that this is really possible is rather naïve as long as the general political and economic conditions in sending countries remain unfavourable. Moreover, such ideas imply that states should and can 'tap' individuals' remittances and assume (rather paternalistically) that states know better than individuals how to use income for welfare improvement.

### 3.8: IMPACT ON HOST COUNTRIES' ECONOMY AND SOCIETY

#### Economic impacts

As already mentioned in section 2.8, migration has a significant impact on the country's economy. However, it is often argued that the potential benefit of migration is far from being fully realised. As will be described in more detail in Section 4, South Africa is suffering profound skills shortages as a consequence a crisis in its own education system, but also due to high rates of professional emigration. Thus, it has been suggested that this 'brain drain' can be compensated to a significant part through encouraging and facilitating a 'brain gain' through immigration particularly from the SADC region (Waller 2006:5). However, the South African government has been slow in acknowledging and addressing the dynamics of both brain drain and brain gain through migration (Landau and Wa Kabwe Segatti 2009:25). First steps towards an acknowledgment of the potential of, and indeed necessity for, skilled immigration can be seen with the 2006 Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (ASGISA) and the Joint Initiative on Priority Skills Acquisition (JIPSA). As of now there needs to be greater awareness of the profile and contribution of South Africa's current stock of skilled immigrants' (Mattes et al 2000:2). Discrimination in the labour market, as well as a lack of access to work permits or certification is prevalent, effectively resulting in South Africa 'missing out' not only on valuable expertise and talent but also on potential tax collections (Bloch 2006:2, 83). Altman (2008:4) states that, 'Zimbabweans, whether with tertiary degrees or not, are more likely to have entrepreneurial, artisanal, and agricultural skills than South Africans (...) the more they are excluded from mainstream SA society, the less SA gains from these skills.' Despite initiatives like ASGISA or JIPSA, the process of acquiring the right to work in South Africa remains an extremely cumbersome and lengthy process, effectively deterring foreigners from working in the country and making it extremely difficult for South African businesses to hire them.

#### Social impacts

Combined with South Africa's own ethnic heterogeneity, the arrival and presence of people from all over the African continent and beyond render South Africa a truly hyper-diverse place. However, rather than celebrating and building upon the creativity and energy of such cosmopolitanism and diversity, the presence of foreigners has given rise to well-documented high levels of xenophobia throughout virtually all social strata (Landau 2006, Crush 2000, Crush et al. 2005). Discourses of exclusion frequently construct migration in terms of intrusion and threat, drawing on metaphors of flooding, swamping, infiltration or even invasion in relation to migrants. To be sure, the reasons for high levels of xenophobia in South Africa are complex and manifold. Aside from staggering rates of unemployment and resulting competition for resources, high levels of crime, prevalence of diseases such as HIV/AIDS and unemployment (all of which foreigners are habitually blamed for), it has also been suggested 'that the isolation that South Africans experienced during apartheid means that they have no experience in incorporating other groups and tend to be intolerant of outsiders'(Morris 1998 in Palmary et al. 2003:114). What is often less known about the apartheid era is that it was not only the separation between white and non-white that was enforced via official discourse and spatial practices, but also the difference between South Africa and the rest of the world, which was crucial for the apartheid state in order to maintain its legitimacy and identity. The African continent was portrayed as anarchic, backward and politically unstable, as a destructive force that needed to be constantly monitored. As Klotz (2000:839) argues, these discourses of 'Africa as the mental location of the threat' have persisted far beyond the apartheid era and continue to fuel xenophobia towards African migrants in South Africa today. In 2008, Johannesburg became the epicentre of a series of unprecedented xenophobic violent attacks directed towards (mostly African) foreign nationals. The smouldering

xenophobia that experts had been observing and warning about for years<sup>11</sup> erupted in Johannesburg's Alexandra Township and quickly spread to several other informal settlements as well as inner-city areas in and around Johannesburg. From there, it also spread to other places around the country. It is estimated that over the course of only a few weeks more than 60 people lost their lives, almost 700 were injured and an estimated 100,000 or more were displaced (Misago et al. 2009).

As of now, the broader social, economic and cultural implications of xenophobia are often ignored by policy makers and are rarely thought of as an developmental issue (Harcourt 2009:442), in South Africa as much as elsewhere. Yet, xenophobia has profound impacts on both migrant and host populations: it heightens the vulnerability and discrimination of all those considered 'different' or 'Other', creates profound inequalities within a society, fosters distrust of diversity, undermines the rule of law and poses a major obstacle to social cohesion and social justice (Crush and Ramachandran (2009:3, 60). The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights emphasises this link between social cohesion and successful development and states that 'combating discrimination helps prevent conflicts and social unrest, and contributes to economic growth. Equality is fundamental to social harmony; it is essential for the promotion of good governance, sustainable development and the fair allocation of available resources' (OHCHR 2007). As Crush and Ramachandran (2009:80) write, combating xenophobia requires political leaders to take a strong stand in acknowledging and condemning xenophobic sentiment and violence; to emphasise the benefits migrants can bring; to defend the rights of migrants within a society and 'to introduce social and cultural policies that foster social cohesion and celebrate diversity.' However, despite the magnitude and horror of the xenophobic attacks in May 2008, the official government response to these events essentially denied the extent of xenophobia in the country.<sup>12</sup>

As Kaplan (2009:466) emphasizes, 'countries whose citizens share common ideas about who they are and how they should work together are far more likely to enjoy the state legitimacy and good governance necessary to spur and sustain economic and political development.' South Africa – as many other places around the world - is faced with the challenge of finding at least some common ground between not only a diverse and fragmented citizenry but also between South Africans and all foreign residents of varying status within the country. However, as of now, few attempts towards overcoming xenophobia have been made: 'rather than replacing existing divisions with shared rules of economic and social engagement, discrimination against non-citizens threatens further fragmentation and social marginalization'(Landau and Wa Kabwe Segatti 2009:35). Moves towards more regional approaches to managing migration and promoting development are also hampered by xenophobia, fears about national security and the exclusive nationalism widely present in South Africa (Crush and Oucho 2001:150).

### 3.9: IDENTIFICATION OF RESEARCH GAPS

There is an urgent need for better, more reliable and generally much more detailed data on international migration.

The lack of reliable and accurate data on remittance flows is a worldwide problem (Kapur 2003:28) and the Southern African region is no exception to this. Thus, there is a need for more nationally representative data and research on the impacts and uses of remittances in the major migrant-sending countries, both at local as well as national levels. As Bracking and Sachikonye (2009:208) highlight, 'much current research on the poverty reducing effects of migrant remittances is not carried out in weak states or isolated economies, but in relatively well-governed migrant export economies.'

Importantly, such research needs to be unbiased and non-ideological in its assumptions and be designed in a fashion able to explore both detriment and positive impacts of remittance flows in order to reach a better informed and realistic assessment of their current and future developmental potential. In the absence of reliable nationally representative data, smaller qualitative studies or surveys are needed in the meantime. All evidence available here, seems to confirm Kapur's (2003:28-29) suggestion that 'it would appear that remittances are a better instrument to address transient poverty, which arises due to shocks whether at households or national level, rather than structural poverty'(see also de Haas 2007:27). Yet, as Bakewell (2009:55, author's emphasis) argues, 'if we are concerned with *human* development, the reduction in poverty brought by remittances does represent a very real improvement in people's wellbeing.' Thus, there is a need for much more nuanced approaches to the multifaceted nature of remittances impacts and possible multiplier effects. There are many questions unanswered: do negative effects of increased inter-household inequalities diminish as the costs of migration diminish overtime due to the increased strength of migration networks? What are possible multiplier effects from predominantly consumptive spending of remittances, for example in the fields of health and education, and how can we measure them? (de Haas 2010:249)? The focus on cash and in-kind remittances has also meant that there is no research done on more intangible forms of remittances in the forms of ideas, knowledge and cultural practices – what Levitt (1998) has called 'social remittances'. Hence, we know little about the ways in which migrants act as 'agents of change and innovation', as they were conceptualised - albeit slightly over-enthusiastically- by much of development theory in the 1950's and 1960's (de Haas :231, Kapur 2003:29). We also know little about potential ways in which power balances might be affected or shift through a substantial remittance sending-Diaspora and their political influence in Southern African countries.

Then there is certainly more research needed on the current stock of South Africa's skilled immigrants (Mattes et al 2000:8) and on how the skills of those already in the country can be put to better use than it is currently the case. As already described in the introduction, there is also the urgent need for an inherently translocal perspective on migration and development. Then, we will need to acquire a better understanding of the interrelation between particular socio-political and institutional conditions and practices – in particular that of the xenophobia so pervasive in South Africa – and populations dynamics and development, both nationally as well as regionally.

In relation to all types of migration described in this report, be it internal, contract and cross-border migration, this report suggests to take some of our focus away from migrants and migration policies specifically, and to look at government policy and practice in more general terms. Important areas of policy that have direct or indirect impacts on migrants (as well as on the poor in general) are, to name but a few, banking, land tenure systems, housing, informal trading or business licensing. There is a need to explore in more detail the ways currently existing policies impact on the social and economic integration of the poor, including poor migrants, and their ability to earn a livelihood in South Africa and the region.

## **SECTION 4: DIASPORA AND IMMIGRANT SETTLERS**

### **4.1: OVERVIEW OF DIASPORA POPULATION OF THE COUNTRY**

The UK, the USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand are the five major receiving countries for emigrants leaving South Africa (Mattes et al 2000:11). Official statistics in South Africa are however known to significantly underestimate the number of emigrants, especially with regard to the period from the 1990s onwards. This is due to the fact that such data capture methods rely on

self-disclosure of emigrants and thus imply high levels of underreporting (Meyer et al 2000:2, Mattes et al 2000:11). South African data are thus less reliable than data captured on South African immigration in the receiving countries. Mattes et al (2000:11) report that from data provided by the five countries listed above, approximately 233,609 people left South Africa to settle abroad in the UK, the USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand between 1989 and 1997. The official South African number for this group of emigrants however is a mere 82,811 – a difference of over 150,000 people. The 2001 UK census counted approximately 140,000 South African born residents in the UK – about half of which are assumed to live in the Greater London area (IOM 2008:5). Lucas (2000:34) reports that there were 71,000 South Africans in Australia in 1996, as compared to only 15,500 in 1976. The latest estimate for 2010 from the World Bank puts the total South African Diaspora at 878,000, about 1.7 % of the entire South African population (World Bank 2011).

A small study of South Africans in London found that,

South African immigrants have the sixth highest employment rate comparing to other nationalities, with 81.5% in work. Their high levels of education, employment and annual earnings suggest that in general South Africans fare similarly to immigrant groups from Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the United States (IOM 2008:28).

The study also found that nearly one fifth (18.4%) of UK based South Africans earns more than £750 a week, but that 15% are considered as low-income earners at about £149 per week.

#### 4.2: IMPACT ON FAMILY; 4.3: IMPACT ON COMMUNITY AND 4.4: CONTRIBUTION TO LOCAL ECONOMY OF THE HOME COUNTRY

No studies are available on these topics. Given the fact that the South African emigrants tend to be skilled and comparatively well-off, it is likely that migrant-sending households and communities are less *dependant* on remittances than those of migrants within and towards the country, and that remittances sent might be used more frequently in productive ways, rather than for consumption only.

#### 4.5: IMPACT ON HOME COUNTRY NATIONAL ECONOMY AND SOCIETY

Combined with a crisis in its education system and ability to train enough South Africans especially in the sciences, health and technical professions, (Cross et al 2009:25), the brain drain resulting from skilled emigration in South Africa is profound, especially in fields so crucial such as the medical profession. Given that the country is already suffering from a lack of qualified healthcare professionals, the prolonged and sustained emigration of doctors and nurses has a significant impact on South Africa. IOM (2007:8) estimates that between one third and half of all medical school graduates emigrate to the United Kingdom or the United States alone every year. This brain drain limits the country's ability to address the high levels of disease prevalent in South Africa; negatively effects the quality and availability of healthcare and leaves particularly rural and socio-economically disadvantaged communities in dire straits (IOM 2007:11). In the same report, IOM (2007:11) cites an assessment done by the WHO in 2003, which found,

that more than 60 % of South African healthcare institutions struggled to replace nurses lost as a result of emigration. With more than 4,000 vacancies for general practitioners and upwards of 32,000 nursing vacancies throughout the country, the severity of the problem is profound.

IOM reports that in 2003, over one fifth of the public health sector posts were vacant in the majority of South Africa's provinces (IOM 2007:12). Bundred and Levitt (2000) report that 600 South African-trained medical graduates are registered doctors in New Zealand – trained in South Africa at a cost of USD 37 million. As Meyer, et al (2000:19) point out, emigration and skilled emigration has always been a feature of South Africa, yet what is different since 1994 is that it no longer is replaced by enough immigration in order to replace the skills lost (or, to be more accurate, by preventing skilled immigrants from replacing the skills lost to emigration).

The World Bank estimates that Inward remittance flows to South Africa increased from 434 Million US Dollar in 2003 to 1,008 Million US Dollar in 2010 (World Bank 2011).

#### 4.6: IMPACT ON HOST COUNTRIES' NATIONAL ECONOMY AND SOCIETY

IOM (2007:8) reports that the influx of healthcare professionals from South Africa is vital for many of the receiving countries. In the UK, one of the major recipient countries, more than 6 % of the total healthcare workforces are South Africans. Between 2000 and 2004, the UK's National Health Service (NHS) registered over 6000 South African nurses – despite measures put in place that are supposed to discourage the recruitment of South African nurses. In Canada, one out of ten physicians is South African (IOM 2007:9).

#### 4.7: IDENTIFICATION OF RESEARCH GAPS

Apart from a few studies on the topic of the brain drain, the South African Diaspora is an almost entirely un-researched field. There are no studies existing on the impacts of South African emigration on families, community development nor the contribution to local economies in South Africa.

## APPENDIX I: DATASETS ON MIGRATION IN SOUTH AFRICA

### 1992 ONWARDS Agincourt Health and Demographic Surveillance System (AHDSS)

'The AHDSS database contains the data resulting from the exhaustive coverage of demographic events within a geographically defined population, namely the Agincourt sub-district of the Bushbuckridge district of South Africa. As of 2008, the study site consists of 26 villages with a population of around 82,000 persons. Fertility, mortality, and migration data are based on a comprehensive registration system starting with a baseline enumeration of the whole population in 1992.'

Source: [www.agincourt.co.za](http://www.agincourt.co.za)

### 2002-2007 General Household Survey

The General Household Survey (GHS) is conducted annually by Statistics South Africa from 2002. The survey collects information on a variety of subjects including education, health, the labour market, dwellings, access to services and facilities, transport, and quality of life.

For more information and datasets from 2003-2007 go to [www.statssa.gov.za/publications/statsabout.asp?PPN=P0318.1&SCH=4436](http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/statsabout.asp?PPN=P0318.1&SCH=4436)

### 1995 and 1999 October Household Survey (OHS)

Prior to the GHS, the October Household Survey collected Labour Force statistics as well as general information about households and service delivery between 1995 and 1999.

For more information and 1999 and 1995 datasets go to [www.statssa.gov.za/publications/statsabout.asp?PPN=P0317&SCH=854](http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/statsabout.asp?PPN=P0317&SCH=854)

### 1996 and 2001 South Africa Census

The census in South Africa is carried out every 5 years by Statistics South Africa. The only two to date were in 1996 and 2001. why was there no census in 2006? Next one will be in 2011.

For census 1996 publications go to [www.statssa.gov.za/publications/statsabout.asp?PPN=Census96&SCH=3116](http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/statsabout.asp?PPN=Census96&SCH=3116)

For census 2001 publications go to [www.statssa.gov.za/publications/statsabout.asp?PPN=Census01&SCH=3115](http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/statsabout.asp?PPN=Census01&SCH=3115)

### 1993 Project for Statistics on Living Standards and Development

Survey conducted by the Southern Africa Labour & Development Research Unit (SALDRU). The following section is quoted from SALDRU's website:

'The principal purpose of the survey, which was undertaken during the nine months leading up to the country's first democratic elections at the end of April 1994, was to collect hard statistical information about the conditions under which South Africans live in order to provide policy makers with the data required for planning strategies to implement such goals as those outlined in the Government of National Unity's Reconstruction and Development Programme (...) the



topics covered by the questionnaire included demography, household services, household expenditure, educational status and expenditure, remittances and marital maintenance, land access and use, employment and income, health status and expenditure and anthropometry.'

For more information and the dataset, go to  
<http://sada.nrf.ac.za/ahdetails.asp?catalognumber=0037>

#### 2001-2002 HSRC Migration Survey

Nationally representative household survey, which used the EA data of the 1996 census. It included 4266 households.

For more information on this survey, see Kok et al (2006) 'The history and methodology of the HSRC surveys', in: Migration in South and Southern Africa: Dynamics and Determinants, Kok, P., Gelderblom, D., Oucho, J. and van Zyl, J. (eds.), HSRC Press: Cape Town: 292-306; as well as van Zyl, J. (2006) 'Evaluating the 2001-02 HSRC Migration Survey', in: Migration in South and Southern Africa: Dynamics and Determinants, Kok, P., Gelderblom, D., Oucho, J. and van Zyl, J. (eds.), HSRC Press: Cape Town: 147-170. Both papers are available for download at [www.hsrcpress.ac.za/product.php?productid=2094&freedownload=1](http://www.hsrcpress.ac.za/product.php?productid=2094&freedownload=1)

2000 South African Migration and Health Survey (SAMHS) survey exploring health and health perceptions amongst South African internal migrants. It was conducted by the Centre for Population Studies, University of Pretoria between 1999 and 2000. It included a national sample of 2371 households selected from 232 census enumerator areas. For more information on the survey, see Roux, N., and van Tonder, L. (2006) 'Migration and Health in South Africa', in: Migration in South and Southern Africa: Dynamics and Determinants, Kok, P., Gelderblom, D., Oucho, J. and van Zyl, J. (eds.), HSRC Press: Cape Town: 120-146.

#### 2004/05 MARS (Migration and Remittance Survey)

This survey on migration and remittance flows and usage has been carried out by the Southern African Migration Project (SAMP) amongst 4700 households in Botswana, Lesotho, Southern Mozambique, Swaziland and Zimbabwe between 2004 and 2005. The MARS survey collected two different types of data: data on individual household members, both migrant and non-migrant, and data on migrant-sending household, asking questions about migration trajectories, occupations, demographics and remittance behaviour and usage. For more information on the survey, see Pendleton, W., Crush, J., Campbell, E., Green, T., Simelane, H., Tevera, D. and de Vletter, F. (2006) 'Migration, Remittances and Development in Southern Africa', SAMP Migration Policy Paper Nr. 44. Accessed January 2011 at ([www.queensu.ca/samp/sampresources/samppublications/](http://www.queensu.ca/samp/sampresources/samppublications/))

## APPENDIX II: SEARCH TERMS USED IN GOOGLE AND DATABASE SEARCHES

South Africa, Southern Africa, SADC, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Lesotho, Swaziland, Malawi, Botswana, Zambia

### **AND**

domestic migration, internal migration, migration, population mobility, mobility, international migration, cross-border migration, contract migration, contract migration system

### **AND (one or several)**

development, 'obstacles to development', 'challenges to development', economic growth, economy, brain drain, brain gain, impacts (economic, social, cultural political), health, HIV/AIDS, access to healthcare, sexual networks, social networks, relationships, children, family, families, family members, education, remittances, remittance flows, remittance use, consumption, investment, skills, labour market, 'labour market participation', household wellbeing, children, income, discrimination, xenophobia, social cohesion, society, economy, rural, urban, local, national, regional, community, mining, agriculture, commercial farming, construction.

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<sup>1</sup> For further information, the appendix provides some brief information on some of the most frequently used quantitative datasets in the studies reviewed here.

<sup>2</sup> It has been suggested that this largely due to the assumption that with the end of the Apartheid state's highly regulated and forcible system of labour migration, patterns of circular migration would eventually disappear or at least drastically reduce. It was assumed that as people were now legally unrestrained in their movements, temporary migration would decline and previously temporary migrants would eventually become permanent immigrants in other places within the country (Posel 2003:1, 2003b).

<sup>3</sup> Collinson et al (2009: 28) drawing on Agincourt 2001-2005 data report that 'female migrants are more likely to come from female-headed households which are in turn more likely to be in the poorer half of the socio-economic distribution (...) for the poorest households the most important factors improving SES<sup>3</sup> are government grants and female temporary migrants, while for better-off households male temporary migrants and local employment are the most important factors.'

<sup>4</sup> However, while those within and without the country who defied these laws faced significant risks, this did not stop other forms of migration into South Africa taking place. For example, hundreds of thousands of Mozambicans are estimated to have migrated to South Africa during the civil war (1975-1992), in particular during the late 1980s (de Jongh 1994:220, Lubkemann 2000:42-44, Polzer 2007:27). In South Africa they were then considered 'illegal immigrants, without the right to seek employment, own livestock, or cultivate land' (de Jongh 1994:220-221). These Mozambicans settled in South Africa's 'bantustans', or homelands - the areas designated for Black people, which were officially (yet not in reality) autonomous 'nations' (Brown 2009:12). The semi-autonomous status of the homelands, described above, was the reason that the Apartheid government informally allowed these areas to host Mozambican refugees (Polzer 2007: 27). (Somewhat ironically, the migration of black South Africans, stripped of their citizenship, out of these homelands, was essentially considered international migration within Apartheid South Africa (I am indebted to this point to Loren Landau).

<sup>5</sup> The African Centre for Migration and Society is currently conducting research on the involvement of migrants in the hospitality sector. However, the research findings were not yet available while this present report was written.

<sup>6</sup> <http://data.worldbank.org/country/south-africa>, [www.southafrica.info/business/economy/sectors/mining/htm](http://www.southafrica.info/business/economy/sectors/mining/htm), [www.climateriskandopportunity.co.za/downloads/A14\\_Construction.200912.pdf](http://www.climateriskandopportunity.co.za/downloads/A14_Construction.200912.pdf)

<sup>7</sup> These migration flows include African migrants from all over the continent as well as, for example, Chinese and Pakistani migrants. However, given this section's focus on cross-border migration, these groups are not included here.

<sup>8</sup> The usefulness and appropriateness of the forced/economic distinction has been questioned for example by Landau and Wa Kabwe Segatti (2009).

<sup>9</sup> Of these, 4.567 were approved, 46.055 were rejected and 172.702 were added to the backlog of unprocessed cases.

<sup>10</sup> Of these, 22 % were born in Europe (largely a legacy of immigration in the apartheid era). Of the rest, 687.678 (or 67 %) were born in neighbouring SADC countries. Only 41.817 (or 4 %) reported being born in the rest of Africa and 40.889 (or 4 %) in Asia.

<sup>11</sup> Sporadic violent and even fatal attacks on foreigners have been recorded ever since the mid-1990s.

<sup>12</sup> In his speech given to commemorate the victims, President Thabo Mbeki frequently for example called what happened 'criminal activities', 'criminal violence' or 'criminal onslaught. He also stated that 'the dark days of May which have brought us here today were visited on our country by people who acted with *criminal* intent. What happened during these days was not inspired by a perverse nationalism, or extreme chauvinism, resulting in our communities violently expressing the *hitherto unknown sentiment* of mass and mindless hatred of foreigners – xenophobia' (Mbeki 2008, author's emphasis).